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"TIRED OF WAITING":
SENATOR ALBERT B. FALL'S ALTERNATIVE
TO WOODROW WILSON'S MEXICAN POLICIES,

1920-1921

CLIFFORD W. TROW

ON 10 AUGUST 1919, the Mexican newspaper El Universal asked
a crucial question of a recently appointed Senate subcommittee to
investigate Mexican affairs. Did the subcommittee members favor
"armed intervention" as the best means of protecting foreign interests in Mexico? Reminding Chairman Albert B. Fall of New
Mexico that El Universal had been unique among Mexican dailies
in supporting the Allies during World War I, the newspaper asserted that because of the differences in strength between Mexico
and the United States, armed intervention would constitute an
invasion similar to that of Belgium by the Germans.!
After conferring with the full Committee on Foreign Relations,
Senator Fall responded to El Universal. Neither he as chairman of
the subcommittee nor his colleagues Frank B. Brandegee of Connecticut and Mark Smith of Arizona would reply individually. Instead, Fall asserted, the subcommittee would discharge its duties
"without fear, favor, or prejudice" and would be "guided by the
facts and circumstances as developed through an investigation,"
which would be "most thorough and exhaustive."2
Eight months later, as he was preparing his official report to the
Senate with recommendations for a change in United States policy
toward Mexico, Fall confided in his wife: "It is now agreed that
the overthrow of Carranza was brought about by the activities of
this committee. . . ." Emphasizing that his response to El Universal's question about intervention had been interpreted in Mexico
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by most of the political factions as meaning that Venustiano Carranza must "get out," Fall noted that the action of his subcommittee
had broken the nerve of Carranza's followers. The Mexicans understood, Fall stressed, that the Congress was "tired of waiting" and
intended to act.
Although he may have overstated the effects of his subcommittee's investigation in precipitating the overthrow of Carranza, Fall
correctly assessed the sentiment of the dominant majority of the
sixty-second Congress. They were so opposed to the "watchful
waiting" approach of President Woodrow Wilson that they intended
to stay in session until December to check the president's Mexican
policies. 3 Many of the members of the Republican-controlled Congress viewed the president's restraint as weakness and his reliance
upon diplomacy rather than military force in Mexico to secure the
protection of American lives and property as a weak and vacillating
approach that prolonged turmoil' in the southern republic. 4
By August 1919, when the Senate authorized the Fall subcommittee's investigation of Mexican affairs, many of Fall's colleagues
from both parties had become convinced that the United States
should straighten out Mexico by anned intervention. Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge, Republican from Massachusetts, was such an "interventionist." Since 1914 Lodge had voiced his criticism of the
Wilson administration's Mexican policies. When the new Congress
convened in 1919, Lodge had been chosen by his Republican colleagues to be chairman of the influential Committee on Foreign
Relations. It was Lodge who had appointed Fall to be chairman of
the subcommittee investigating Mexican affairs. After the subcommittee had issued its "interim" report in December 1919, Lodge
wrote to friends that the aim of the Fall subcommittee was to work
for a "proper" solution to the Mexican problem, one that would
make the "Cuban arrangement" with Mexico. On 22 December
1919, Lodge told Maj. Gen. James H. Wilson that he could not
see any escape from intervention and the erection of a government
in Mexico that the United States could sustain. S
From the beginning of its investigation in September 1919 until
May 1920, the Fall subcommittee worked closely with a large group
of vested interests that had already organized a publicity campaign
to swing public opinion behind a harsh policy toward Mexico. In
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fact, the relationship was so close that it is impossible to separate
the activities of the subcommittee from what was, in fact, an organized movement to force the Wilson administration to intervene
in Mexico. Aided by a coalition of interests including the Association
of Oil Producers in Mexico, the National Association for the Protection of American Rights in Mexico (NAPARIM), and a number
of smaller investors represented in the membership of the Murray
Hill group, the Fall subcommittee prepared a sensational case against
the Mexican government of Venustiano Carranza. 6
Early in December 1919, Fall in effect tipped his hand, revealing
his interventionist trumps. During the crisis with Mexico over the
kidnapping of Consular Agent William O. Jenkins, Fall issued a
special report on behalf ofhis subcommittee in which he announced
that the Carranza government was spreading Bolshevik propaganda
in the United States. Fall then introduced a concurrent resolution
that upheld the State Department in making peremptory demands
for the release of Jenkins. The resolution also called for the severance of diplomatic relations with Mexico.
As newspapers headlined the imminence of war with Mexico,
President Wilson responded from his sick bed in disapproval of the
Fall resolution. That disapproval and the release ofJenkins prompted
the Foreign Relations Committee to let the resolution die, much
to the annoyance of Fall and Lodge. As his subcommittee travelled
to the Southwest early in 1920, Fall directed his attack not only at
the Carranza regime, but also toward President Wilson, who was
made to appear responsible for the Mexican situation. 7
In May 1920, however, the Mexican situation suddenly changed
as a coup d'etat replaced the Carranza government with a new
provisional government under Adolfo de la Huerta. Gen. Alvaro
Obregon, a participant in the coup, was generally regarded to be
the certain victor in the Mexican election scheduled for September
of that year. Huerta and Obregon tried to ease the tension by
promising that the new Mexican government would protect American lives and property. The Mexican leaders also tried to reassure
the big American oil companies that their property would not be
expropriated, that Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917
would not be interpreted retroactively.8 Officials of the Association
of Oil Producers in Mexico and NAPARIM were encouraged by
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these pledges. Almost immediately NAPARIM began to consider
the possibility of sending a large delegation to Mexico to discuss
outstanding differences with the Mexican government. 9
Fall opposed the project. Reflecting the viewpoint of the independent oil operators and of the smaller investors, Fall told Harold
Walker, attorney for Edward L. Doheny, who was one of the largest
American oil producers in Mexico, that it would be a mistake for
the large companies to make special arrangements with the new
Mexican government. He argued that the big companies had been
able to keep operating, but 15,000 small American farmers had
been driven out of Mexico. The issue should not be confused by
Americans independently treating with the Mexican government,
he said. Referring to the work of his committee and its forthcoming
recommendations, Fall emphasized that the whole Mexican issue
should be settled at once and settled right. With a rare optimism,
Fall asserted that at last they were in a position to settle it right. 10
In a letter to Doheny describing the long conversation, Walker
indicated that Fall had been in close contact with Secretary of State
Bainbridge Colby and that they were agreed that nothing in the
way of recognition should be given to the new Mexican government
until that government had shown by its actions that it would treat
all Americans justly. Walker added that Fall was considering putting
into his committee report "an idea of negotiating a treaty" but no
treaty would be ratified by the Senate that failed to clear up all
the points for all Americans and guaranteed their safety and respect
for their interests. The United States government, Fall told Walker,
is "our protector." Walker found Fall confident that either a satisfactory settlement would be made or an intervention would occur.
Noting that Fall was bending all his efforts to the Mexican matter,
Walker advised Doheny that Fall has been "our best friend and
our best bet and I believe that his advice should be given great
consideration." 11
Undoubtedly because they believed that Fall spoke for the Republican-controlled Congress and that he had correctly reflected
the sentiment within the State Department, the Association of Oil
Producers in Mexico and its subSidiary propaganda organization,
NAPARIM, decided to follow Fall's advice.
Fall submitted his lengthy report with the testimonies of 257
witnesses and with his recommendations to the United States Sen-
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ate on 20 May 1920,12 The recommendations called for a prolonged
period of nonrecognition for the new government in Mexico while
it demonstrated its ability to protect American lives and property,
During the period of nonrecognition the United States would hold
not only the Mexican government but all of the Mexican factions
strictly accountable for any outrage or injustice to American life
and property in Mexico. 13
After a period of stabilizing itself and of displaying its willingness
to uphold the rules of international law, the new Mexican government could secure recognition by agreeing in a formal treaty to
change sections of the Constitution of 1917, especially by providing
exemptions for Americans from the constitution's most revolutionary provisions, i. e" from Articles 3, 27, 33, and 130.J4 In addition,
Mexico would have to agree to participate with the United States
in constituting joint commissions to settle boundary and claims
disputes. 15 Should Mexico be unwilling to make such treaty agreements,Fall recommended that the United States should react vigorously by again warning the Mexican government that it must
protect American life and by taking military action when the Mexican government failed to provide protection.
Reaction to the proposals of the Fall subcommittee was mixed,
Mexicans of all factions were alarmed at what the recommendations,
if implemented, would do to Mexican sovereignty. Certain segments of the American press and the more liberal community condemned the Fall approach as extreme. From the "hands up, your
money or your life" description in the New Republic to the milder
view of the New York Times that the new government deserved a
chance to put its house in order before being met with such stringent demands, the press generally agreed with the New Republic
as it admonished the Mexican government to put an end to the
epoch of revolution if intervention were to be forestalled. 17
By spring of 1920, Fall had the requisite position and support
to exert a powerful influence over Mexican affairs. No senator spoke
in opposition to the Fall report and recommendations when they
were submitted through the Committee on Foreign Relations to
the Senate for acceptance. 18 JOined by a solid majority party contingent headed by Lodge, the hard line senators, including many
Democrats, were a powerful force in that house, while the sentiment in the lower house was probably of a similar tone. 19

Albert B. Fall. Courtesy of UNM Special Collections Department.
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Although he did not attend the June convention, Fall was most
influential in determining the plank on Mexico in the Republican
Party's platform. He prepared the plank to conform to the recommendations of his subcommittee. Not only did that convention
accept Fall's recommendations, but it also strengthened Fall's influence by nominating his good friend and colleague on the Committe on Foreign Relations, Warren G. Harding, as the Republican
candidate for president. 20
Mexico was only one of a number of important issues that divided
the candidates during the campaign of 1920. Fall advised Harding
on Mexican matters, and his influence was evident as the Ohio
senator condemned the Mexican policies of Woodrow Wilson as
weak and vacillating. Democratic candidate Governor James Cox
of Ohio took an opposite view. He opposed intervention by asserting that he would not send American troops into a "hornet's
nest" in order to enhance the interests of American property owners, especially those who had invested in oillands,2l
While the campaign proceeded toward a November victory for
the Republicans, the Wilson administration and Senator Fall gave
a great deal of attention to new developments in Mexico. Huerta's
provisional government made a concerted effort to gain recognition
and to secure financial aid from the United States.
Fall carefully watched Mexican developments. At last he was in
a position for his program to predominate. There were dangers,
however. He had no confidence in Woodrow Wilson, even though
he believed that the State Department approved his approach of
nonrecognition. In addition, the disparate interests that he had
assembled in his "interventionist" coalition were no longer in agreement as to what the best approach might be in dealing with the
new Mexican government. 22 At the moment when Fall's optimism
was the highest, some of these interests hoped to make separate
arrangements with the Mexican government.
Fall's concern was compounded when Fernando Iglesias Calder6n, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, arrived at the
State Department late in June. In the unofficial interviews that
followed, Iglesias Calder6n assured Under-Secretary of State Norman Davis that all responsible parties in his country desired peace
with the United States and that a policy of friendship was necessary
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for the salvation of Mexico. The Mexican ambassador added that
Mexico would make reparation for damages done to Americans in
Mexico and would provide them with protection. 23 After receiving
instructions from President Wilson that the Mexican situation "was
too full ofdoubts" for immediate consideration ofrecognition, Davis
indicated to Iglesias Calderon that the United States was desirous
of encouraging peaceful developments but that recognition would
occur when it was opportune. 24
While Iglesias Calderon was being received unofficially at the
department, Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby conferred with
former Secretary of Interior Franklin Lane and his new employer,
E. L. Doheny. According to Lane, the secretary of state hypnotized
Doheny into thinking that he could perform miracles. Shortly
thereafter Lane sent Colby a ten-page outline of a suggested treaty
with Mexico. The friendly reception given to representatives of the
Association of Oil Producers in Mexico led them to believe Fall's
assertion that the State Department was supportive of his recommendations. 25
In the meantime, Fall responded to a request of Iglesias Calderon that they confer on Mexico. The conference was polite but
to the point. Fall insisted that the recommendations of his subcommittee would be implemented as policy. Shocked to find that Fall
had not moderated his position since the overthrow of Carranza,
the Mexican asserted that his country would not humiliate itself
by accepting a treaty based upon the Fall recommendations.
Fall replied that his recommendations were those of the United
States government since the State Department had indicated its
agreement. Iglesias Calderon refused to believe Fall. He asserted
that Under-Secretary Davis had told him that the United States
would never demand conditions that would give Americans a privileged position in Mexico. 26
Fall realized that the ruling factions in Mexico had not been
convinced that his program would prevail. He sought to dispel
illusions. Through his friend Myron Parker, the senator communicated directly with President-elect Obregon. Parker told Obregon that there would be no recognition until Mexico agreed to
settle points in dispute. "So far as the Department of State is
concerned," Parker said, "I can assure you, General, with full
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knowledge and all truthfulness that before any treaty is entered
into, a satisfactory arrangement must be entered into, and that
agreement recorded in black and white. "27
Mexico's quest for official recognition did not end with Fall's
statements to Iglesias Calderon and Obregon. More determined
than ever, Huerta attempted to secure the support of President
Wilson by recruiting George Creel, former wartime head of the
Committee on Public Information to act for Mexico in dealing with
the administration. In September Creel obtained an interview with
his friend, Woodrow Wilson. 28 He told the president of his many
conversations with representatives of the Mexican government and
especially about their new attitude, which seemed quite reasonable, Creel then asked for permission to go to Mexico for Wilson,
but unofficially and at his own expense, to convey his sentiments
to the Mexican leader concerning an acceptable settlement prior
to recognition. "We had the fullest understanding of the settlement
desired," Creel wrote, What Wilson insisted upon, "and all that he
did insist upon," were: first, Mexico's recognition ofher obligations
under international law with respect to the protection of life and
property and with respect to the ascertainment and payment of
just claims; and second, that Article 27 of the new constitution
should not be given retroactive effect in the sense of confiscating
duly acquired property rights,29
With Wilson's encouragement and Colby's assent, Creel journeyed to Mexico City early in October. He conferred with General
Obregon, Minister of War Plutarco Elias Calles, and Provisional
President Huerta. At every point he found agreement. When he
returned to Washington in mid-October, he was accompanied by
his friend Roberto V. Pesqueira, who was empowered to enter into
formal understandings that would precede recognition. 30
Although at home in New Mexico, Senator Fall stayed alert to
these new developments. On 19 October, Fall's secretary, Charles
Safford, wired from Washington that Creel and Pesqueira were on
their way from Mexico to make a special appeal to President Wilson
for immediate recognition of the Mexican government. 31 Informed
that the State Department was preparing two memoranda for the
president's consideration in opposition to the special plea, Senator
Fall sought to aid what Creel later described as "a spirit of mys-
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terious opposition in the State Department." Fall immediately wired
his office that he had learned from a Justice Department agent that
Creel was employed by the Mexican government as a publicity
agent arid that his specific task was to obtain recognition. 32 After
consultations with Harold Walker of the Doheny interests and with
others in the coalition of interests backing the Fall program, Fall's
secretary decided that it would be advantageous to send Secretary
Colby a copy of Fall's telegram. 33
Despite opposition in the State Department and a direct attack
by the oil men, Creel's mission seemed assured of success when
President Wilson expressed himself as satisfied with the results of
Creel's conversations. In discussions with the president and with
Secretaries Davis and Colby, Creel argued that recognition would
be a vindication of the administration's Mexican policies, that Mexico would be able to build strongly before 4 March, and that the
interventionist attitude of Harding "will be shown to the people
in all of its shamelessness. "34
To facilitate the process and to meet the State Department's
prescription, Creel drew up a protocol in which Mexico agreed to
constitute a claims commission, to create an arbitration board to
decide border questions, and to refrain from applying the provins of Article 27 retroactively. Creel presented the protocol to
Pesqueira with the explanation that when he signed, it bound his
country absolutely. With full knowledge of the consequences, Pesqueira agreed to the terms of the protocol. Creel relayed news of
the agreement to Colby. The secretary's hearty approval led Creel
to believe that the whole matter was ready to go to the president. 35
On 29 October Colby announced to the press that he had received a letter from Pesqueira containing assurances of a friendly
settlement of all points in dispute between the two nations. By
letter Colby responded that Pesqueira's assurances afforded a basis
upon which "the preliminaries of recognition could confidently
proceed."36 As the nation's press resounded with predictions that
Huerta's provisional government would be recognized immediately, Fall's friends moved into action.
Myron Parker visited the State Department the next day to ask
if the department had not changed its attitude from requiring some
arrangement in "black and white." Parker wrote Fall that depart-
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ment members had denied this and had called his attention to the
last line of the secretary's letter in which, "reading between lines,
it will be seen that a promise in writing will have to be made. "37
Election day, 2 November 1920, with its Republican triumph,
came and went without the administration's recognition of the Mexican provisional government. Three days later, however, Charles
Safford telegraphed Fall that the president was expected to extend
recognition in a general statement in which he would declare that
both countries had agreed to settle points in dispute by arbitration.
Safford recommended that Fall get President-elect Harding to make
a public statement that he favored the Fall program rather than
immediate recognition. Safford also noted that efforts were being
made to require that the understanding be made in specific terms
along the lines of the Fall recommendations. 38
The efforts to which Safford referred were described by the
Washington Times as the "monkey wrench in the wheels," thrown
by the Association of Oil Producers in Mexico. 39 Shortly after Colby
had indicated that recognition might soon be granted, attorneys
for the association requested a hearing at the State Department to
present their views on the Mexican settlement. Judge Charles C.
Parker, heading the group, convinced department officials that the
oil company lawyers should help him draft a memorandum containing their views of what an agreement with Mexico should contain. "We had your report before us all the time," Walker later
wrote to Fall, "and we tried to get into the letter everything you
recommended." Walker added that Colby had promised no recognition would be granted until after 1 January 1921. 40
Colby handed Creel a tentative draft of the Parker memorandum
on 5 November. It was an insult to Mexico, Creel declared in
shocked tones to Colby. Colby replied that the State Department
did not agree with all the conditions stated in the memorandum.
More important, however, Colby said that he had doubts about
the sincerity of the Mexican government in the Pesqueira negotiations. From Colby's attitude, Creel discerned that the negotiations would end in failure and that his own motives were suspect. 41
Creel explored the matter with Colby and discovered that the
State Department had heard rumors that he was in the employ of
either the Mexican government or of the oil companies. Creel
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denied the rumors. Although the secretary said that he put little
stock in such charges, Colby refused to give Creel any assurances
about the future of the Pesqueira negotiations. Creel thought that
he had been subjected to a "guerilla attack" within the department,
and he was angry at Colby's attitude. 42
For two weeks the State Department made no visible effort to
further the Pesqueira negotiations. Creel had expected that the
negotiations would result in an exchange of informal notes between
the two governments prior to the announcement of recognition.
No such process occurred. On 10 November, Provisional President
Huerta gave up on the Pesqueira mission. The Mexican leader
announced that Pesqueira did not have authorization to sign anything for the Mexican government. Creel thought that Huerta had
made his announcement because he was irritated at Colby's delay
and had become suspicious about the strairied silence of the administration. Having already obtained Pesqueira's assent to a protocol,
Creel made a last effort to bring the negotiations to a successful
conclusion. He appealed over Colby's head to President Wilson. 43
Creel wrote a "heated" letter to Colby and sent a copy of it to
Mrs. Wilson for the president to read. Creel recounted his involvement in the Pesqueira negotiations, and he reiterated that he
had gone to Mexico at his expense and with the approval of Wilson
and Colby. "I had made myself responsible for the institution of
an orderly process that the State Department had publicly approved," Creel asserted. Why had that process been interrupted?
Why had enthusiasm died so suddenly? And why had he been
subjected to a "guerilla attack"? Creel asked these questions just
before he commented on the impossibility of Mexico accepting the
Parker memorandum. Significantly, he added the following:
I know, just as you know, that there are selfish interests in the
United States-rich, powerful, and unscrupulous-who do not want
the Mexican question settled. They want a continuance of bitterness
until the day when political conditions are ripe for armed intervention which will guarantee their dividends with American bayonets.
They are telling you that it is best to let matters rest until Obregon's
inauguration, December 1, but when Obregon is President they
will have other reasons to urge further delay. 44
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Creel's letter stirred the president and the secretary of state to
respond by letter and to meet with Creel at the White House.
President Wilson backed Colby and Under-Secretary Davis in their
contention that the Mexican government was acting in "ill faith"
and that the only way to deal with Mexico' was through "hard and
fast and formal" agreements. 45
On 25 November Colby brought the Pesqueira negotiations to
a close. After remarking that the conversations about recognition
had been pleasant, Colby suggested to Pesqueira that "as our fruitful discussions draw to a close that commissioners be promptly
designated by both Mexico and the United States to formulate a
treaty, embodying the agreements, which have been reached as
the result of your successful mission. "46 Creel was embittered over
the failure of the Pesqueira mission. He later wrote Henry Morgenthau that Colby's letter had ended the matter. Creel added:
"Why should the Mexican people bother with a treaty which would
have to go to the Republican Senate?"47
Although the oil interests and Senator Fall thought that Secretary
Colby was supportive of the Fall program for recognition of Mexico,
the president and his secretary of state reluctantly backed away
from the Pesqueira negotiations. Wilson and Colby agreed with
Creel that there were "selfish interests" that wanted to dictat~
Mexican policies to their advantage. A good example of Wilson's
prescience in the matter was the warning he gave to Under-Secretary Davis that "men like Doheny and others who are deeply
invqlved in the oil intrigues" were suspect. "We cannot be too
careful not to serve these predatory interests," Wilson emphasized,
"because they intend the demoralization of our own politics and
the control of Mexican politics. "48
Wilson was not alone in this belief. Colby had written the president on 6 November that Doheny representatives had swarmed
into the State Department in opposition to the Pesqueira mission.
The secretary asserted that the Oil Producers Association was endeavoring to retain former Attorney General Thomas Watt Gregory
for the purpose of conferring with Wilson and that other men "who
have been conspicuous in your [Wilson's] administration are said
to be under retainer, and the number of persons whom I have
reason to suspect of being employed to keep us under observation,
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is almost too numerous for me to enumerate here." Colby advised
the president that the dominant group of oil men wanted to keep
the Mexican situation static until they could try their hand with
the new administration. "Their purpose seems to be to dangle
recognition and financial support in one hand, and with the other
threaten intervention," Colby concluded. 49
The administration turned away from the Pesqueira negotiations,
not because, as Creel suspected and Fall's coalition believed, the
State Department supported Fall's program, but because Wilson
and Colby believed that the negotiations were premature. The
Mexican government would be unable to keep its commitments,
thus building a new case for intervention. The instability of the
Mexican government was apparent, even at the time that negotiations seemed so favorable. On the one hand oil men told Colby
that General Obregon did not want the provisional government
recognized because he feared that Huerta would set aside the
results of the September election and continue himself in power.
On the other hand, Colby heard that the oil men wanted to postpone recognition until Obregon took office because they intended
to make "a Diaz of Obregon."so
Because of the instability of the Mexican government evidenced
in the rumors that he had heard, and because of additional rumors
that Fall and Harding were about to meet in Texas to discuss the
Mexican problem, Secretary Colby decided that the wisest course
for the administration was to "mark time."51 During the interim,
while the administration was marking time, the power and influence of Senator Fall was at its peak. Already his party controlled
Congress, and Fall looked forward to Republican domination of the
entire federal government within a few months.
Because they, too, were politically cognizant, the Mexican leaders sought to cultivate the next administration. While the Pesqueira
mission was awaiting state department initiatives immediately following the November election, Mexico's Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Cutberto Hidalgo, sent a confidential agent to the United States
to confer with Fall and Harding and to invite them to attend the
inauguration of Obregon in early December. 52
Although assured by a friend that General Obregon was enthusiastic about the project, Senator Fall hesitated. 53 He did not want
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to lessen the impact of his Mexican program by appearing to be
friendly to the new regime. After conferring with the Mexican
agent, however, Fall announced the invitation in a press release,
and he arranged for the agent to confer with Harding. 54 Fall's press
release had the effect of complicating Pesqueira's relations with the
State Department. 55 When the Pesqueira mission responded by
producing a telegram from Obregon denying that anyone was
authorized to act for him, Fall had made his point. The "skittish"
character of the Mexican government had been clearly demonstrated. 56 It was further demonstrated later when Harding designated Fall to be his representative to the inauguration, only to have
a Mexican consul on Pesqueira's orders refuse to vise Fall's passportY
Fall was not overly disappointed at the results of his dealings
with the new Mexican government. The publicity given to Pesqueira's meddling had hurt his mission to the United States. Shortly
after he had ordered Fall stopped at the border, Pesqueira received
Colby's letter that effectively ended his negotiations. 58 Fall had not
been enthusiastic about the trip from the first. He agreed with
Walker who wrote that the senator's trip to Mexico might result in
lessening his influence because "Albert Fall at a distance is a more
austere influence than Fall close at hand and affable." Walker told
Fall that Doheny had also received an invitation to the inauguration, but the petroleum association had advised him not to go
because his attendance might "look like capitulation and result in
stiffening Mexico in defiance of your report. "59
Although he was no longer fearful that the Wilson administration
would counter the effects of his recommendations, Fall sought to
guarantee that the incoming Harding regime would implement his
program. His actiqns were twofold: first, he sought to shore up the
coalition of interests that had in the past supported his program
for Mexico; and second, he worked to gain commitments that his
program would be followed from those who would influence foreign
policy.
With the apparent return of law and order in Mexico under a
government that proclaimed its friendship for the United States
and promised to protect American lives and property, many Americans who had been enthusiastic backers ofan interventionist policy
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now became convinced that a speedy recognition of the new government in Mexico would be to their advantage. This was especially
true of the so-called "border jobbers." These Americans who lived
along the Mexican border and who engaged in business activities
with Mexicans had begun to clamor for recognition. Walker wrote
to Fall to assure him that NAPARIM would counteract their activity
by sending a paid propagandist to the border. Walker added that
NAPARIM's instructions to its agent Chester Crowell, a former
editor of eight newspapers in the Southwest, were for him to interview his editor friends and "to put them straight" by emphasizing
that good business conditions were merely temporary and that the
Mexican constitution of 1917 had been inspired by men of Communistic belief. 60
NAPARIM and Fall were partially effective in blunting the demands of the border jobbers for recognition. Fall's coalition was
also concerned that Mexico's new government might secure financial support in the United States from powerful banking interests.
In December, Fall and representatives of the large oil companies
succeeded in convincing two large banking concerns that it would
be a mistake to lend money to the Huerta government. 61
Greater than his concern over activities of the "border jobbers"
or even over the intentions of the large banking houses was Fall's
fear that the oil companies might desert his program to secure their
interests by separate dealings with the Mexican government. Alvaro Obregon compounded that fear when, in February 1921, he
asserted that the demands of the Republican party in the United
States on Mexico were "more extensive" than those that would
satisfY the oil companies. Not only were the oil companies "anxious
to come to an understanding with the new administration in Mexico," Obregon asserted, but also if a basis for agreement could be
arrived at, "they would use whatever influence they possess to
have such an agreement accepted as a complete settlement. "62
If Fall was angry, and he was, other American investors in his
coalition were furious at this clear indication that the large oil
companies might be willing to settle separately with Mexico. Independent operator William F. Buckley was especially disturbed.
Convinced that the large oil companies would desert the independent and smaller investors in Mexico to further their own in-
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terests, Buckley and Paul Hudson of the Murray Hill group broke
with NAPARIM to organize the American Association of Mexico,
which was wedded to the Fall subcommittee's recommendations.
Buckley later accused the oil companies of "playing with the hare
and running with the hounds" as they were privately urging Washington not to recognize Obregon, while their agents in Mexico
had led the Mexican government to infer that the oil companies
were advocating recognition. 63
Although Doheny tried to reassure Fall of his continued support,
the senator was not certain that Doheny could speak for all of the
oil companies represented in NAPARIM.64 Earlier in January, after
a conference with NAPARIM officials, Fall had sent a firm letter
to that organization for general circulation among its membership.
"So long as I have anything to do with the Mexican question," Fall
had stressed, "no government will be recognized, with my consent,
which government does not first enter into a written agreement. . . ." Fall added that he would oppose all private and separate attempts by individual groups to negotiate settlements. 65
Partially convinced by the fact that Fall had been selected to be
a key member of Harding's original cabinet, the Association of Oil
Producers in Mexico and NAPARIM publicly reaffirmed their support of the Fall program in early March 1921. 66
With his coalition of support somewhat fragmented but nonetheless again firmed up, Senator Fall turned his attention to convincing the new administration of which he was a part that his
program for Mexico should be implemented. As early as January
when the new Congress convened, Henry Lane Wilson, a partisan
supporter of the Fall program, began to interview senators and
almost everyone else identified with the incoming Harding administration. According to William F. Buckley, the consensus of those
interviewed was in harmony with the Fall program. 67
In February the New York Times commented editorially on what
it described as an "inspired Washington dispatch" in the Boston
Transcript. According to the dispatch, Senator Fall was not only
destined to be President Harding's secretary of interior, but he was
also going to be the new president's prompter on Mexican policies.
Noting that Fall's program for Mexico contained stringent conditions including constitutional changes and was accompanied by the
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threat of military intervention, the Times concluded: "If Fall is
installed as Harding's adviser, compromise will be more difficult. "68
Fall was confident that his good friend Harding and he saw eye
to eye on Mexican matters. 69 Although he favored Elihu Root first
as secretary of state, Fall was not dissatisfied with Harding's appointment of Charles Evans Hughes for that position, and he was
quite pleased at the choice of Wilson's former ambassador to Mexico
Henry P. Fletcher to be under-secretary. Fall had advised Hughes
about Mexico during the presidential campaign of 1916. On the
basis of that association Fall believed that Hughes would be favorable to a vigorous policy of protection of American interests in
Mexico. 70
Although he probably had no commitment from Hughes, Senator
Fall considered that Fletcher had endorsed his subcommittee's
recommendations. The former ambassador had publicly and privately advised Secretary of State Colby to postpone recognition of
Mexico until a treaty could be negotiated that would settle outstanding differences between the two countries. Fall was not displeased at newspaper speculation that he and Fletcher would be
the experts who would call the shots in the new administration's
Mexican policies. 71
The day before he left the Senate to join Harding's cabinet, Fall
drafted the final report of his subcommittee in the form of a letter
to Chairman Lodge of the Committee on Foreign Relations. In the
report Fall recounted the major occurrences in Mexican affairs since
the end of May 1920 when his subcommittee had submitted the
findings and recommendations resulting from its investigations.
Despite the changed circumstances in Mexico, Fall reiterated the
recommendations of the subcommittee, and he called, for their
implementation. 72
So Fall seemed to have gotten his way on Mexico. Early in 1921
Fall told Thomas Lamont of the J. P. Morgan Company that in the
last six months, the Mexican policies of the Wilson administration
had been 100 percent good. 73 After nearly eight years of attempting
to influence Wilson's "watchful waiting" policies, Fall had been able
to do so by getting the Republican-dominated Congress to act. And
his program had predominated. Or so it seemed! Of course, Mexico
had not signed in black and white. And there could be no use of
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military force to make her sign anything, so long as Wilson was
president. But Wilson's administration was ending! Fall was confident that Harding, Hughes, and Fletcher would soon be following
his program, Mexico would submit to a treaty that would end its
revolution, or the United States would intervene militarily. 74
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